The nature of perception has long been a central question in philosophy. It is of crucial importance not just in the philosophy of mind, but also in epistemology, metaphysics, aesthetics, and the philosophy of science. The essays in this volume not only offer fresh answers to some of the traditional problems of perception, but also examine the subject in light of recent research on mental content. J. J. Valberg and Paul Snowdon discuss the traditional problem of the ‘object’ of perception. Christopher Peacocke and Tim Crane offer accounts of the ‘nonconceptual’ content of perception. Thomas Baldwin and E. J. Lowe explain the place of sensation in perception, while Michael Tye argues that there are no visual sensations or ‘qualia’. Michael Martin examines the relationships between sight and touch, and Brian O’Shaughnessy examines those between perception and action. A substantial introduction locates the essays within the recent history of the subject, and demonstrates the links between them. The Contents of Experience brings together some of the leading philosophers working in the field, and offers a major new statement on a problem central to current philosophical thinking.